Mandating Disclosure in Municipal Securities Issues: Proposed New York Legislation by Currier, Thomas S.
Fordham Urban Law Journal
Volume 8 | Number 1 Article 4
1980
Mandating Disclosure in Municipal Securities
Issues: Proposed New York Legislation
Thomas S. Currier
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ulj
Part of the Banking and Finance Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Fordham Urban Law Journal by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more
information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu.
Recommended Citation
Thomas S. Currier, Mandating Disclosure in Municipal Securities Issues: Proposed New York Legislation, 8 Fordham Urb. L.J. 67 (1980).
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ulj/vol8/iss1/4
Mandating Disclosure in Municipal Securities Issues: Proposed New York
Legislation
Cover Page Footnote
Partner, Dewey, Ballantine, Bushby, Palmer & Wood, New York, New York. L.L.B., 1956, Tulane University.
The author gratefully acknowledges the assistance of P. Adam Kimmel, Associate, Dewey, Ballantine, Bushby,
Palmer & Wood. B.A. 1973, COlumbia College, Columbia University; J.D. 1978, University of California at
Berkeley.
This article is available in Fordham Urban Law Journal: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ulj/vol8/iss1/4
MANDATING DISCLOSURE IN MUNICIPAL
SECURITIES ISSUES: PROPOSED NEW
YORK LEGISLATION
Thomas S. Currier*
I. Introduction
When the federal securities laws were passed in the early 1930's,
issuers and other participants in the distribution and trading of
municipal securities' were exempted2 from all but the general anti-
fraud provisions.3 While one of the principal draftsmen of the Secur-
ities Act explained this exemption as resulting from "obvious politi-
cal reasons,"' testimony before Congress revealed economic5 and
other policy6 justifications for the "hands-off"7 approach adopted by
* Partner, Dewey, Ballantine, Bushby, Palmer & Wood, New York, New York. L.L.B.,
1956, Tulane University. The author gratefully acknowledges the assistance of P. Adam
Kimmel, Associate, Dewey, Ballantine, Bushby, Palmer & Wood. B.A. 1973, Columbia Col-
lege, Columbia University; J.D. 1978, University of California at Berkeley.
1. "Municipal securities" are defined in section 3(a)(29) of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 (hereinafter "the Securities Exchange Act"), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(29) (Supp. 1978), as:
[SJecurities which are direct obligations of, or obligations guaranteed as to principal
or interest by, a State or any political subdivision thereof, or any agency or instrumen-
tality of one or more States, or any security which is an industrial development bond
. . . [which qualifies under certain provisions of the Internal Revenue Code].
2. Section 3(a)(2) of the Securities Act of 1933 (hereinafter "the Securities Act"), 15
U.S.C. § 77c(a)(2) (1970); section 3(a)(12) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C.
§ 78c(a)(12) (1970).
3. Section 17(a) of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1970); sections 10(b) and 15(c)
of the Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C §§ 78j(b), 78o(c) (1970), and rules 10b-5 and 15c-
2 thereunder, 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.10b-5, 240.15cl-2 (1978).
4. Landis, The Legislative History of the Securities Act of 1933, 28 GEo. WASH. L. REv.
29, 39 (1959).
5. It was feared that the imposition of capital requirements on underwriters, the separa-
tion of broker and dealer functions, the costs of independent auditing of municipal finances,
and dealer commitment requirements and underwriter and dealer investigatory duties that
failed to consider the competitive bidding procedures mandated for most municipal issuers
would burden the municipal finance industry generally, impair the marketability of munici-
pal bonds and hinder efforts of municipalities to raise public capital. See Stock Exchange
Practices: Hearings on S.R. 84, S.R.56 & S.R. 97 Before the Senate Comm. on Banking and
Currency, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934); Hearings on H.R. 7852 & H.R. 8720 Before the House
Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934).
6. Proponents of exemption pointed to (a) the sophistication of most municipal securities
investors, (b) the general confidence in the trustworthiness of municipal securities, (c) the
absence of any evidence of abuse in the sale or trading of municipal securities comparable to
that found in the corporate securities markets and (d) possible constitutional problems of
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the Congress. Over the next forty years, however, the mushrooming
volume of municipal securities issues' and increasing entry of non-
institutional investors in that market,' coupled with growing evi-
dence of sale and trading abuses by brokers and dealers,'" led Con-
gress to amend the Securities Exchange Act in 1975." These amend-
ments provide for registration of brokers and dealers, including
banks, of municipal securities with the Securities and Exchange
Commission (hereinafter "the Commission") and for self-
regulation, through the mechanism of a Municipal Securities Rule-
making Board empowered to promulgate rules of general applicabil-
ity pertaining to municipal securities professionals' qualifications,
internal practices and business conduct. 2 These rules are enforced
by the Commission through administrative and judicial proceed-
ings.
In the 1975 amendments Congress did not end the exemption
from Securities Act registration or otherwise mandate disclosures of
material investment information by issuers of municipal securi-
ties. 3 Nevertheless, the contemporaneous near-default of New York
federal regulation of state and municipal governmental entities. See note 5 supra; H. R. REP.
No. 8, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. (1933); Hearings on S. 873 Before the Senate Comm. on Banking
and Currency, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. (1933).
7. See generally Note, Municipal Bonds and the Federal Securities Laws: The Results of
Forty Years of Indirect Regulations, 28 VAND. L. REV. 561, 582-86 (1975).
8. Proposed Amendments to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934: Hearings on S. 2574 &
S. 2969 Before the Subcomm. on Securities of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and
Urban Affairs, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 45 (1976) (statement of H. Kapnick).
9. Id. at 27 (statement of R. Hills). See Dikeman, The Municipal Securities Rulemaking
Board: A New Concept of Self-Regulation, 29 VAND. L. REV. 903, 908 (1976).
10. See text accompanying notes 36-45 infra.
11. Pub. L. No. 94-29, 89 Stat. 97 (codified in scattered subsections of 15 U.S.C. § 78
(Supp. 1978)).
12. See text accompanying notes 46-57 infra.
13. The "Tower Amendments," section 15B(d) of the Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 78o-4(d) (Supp. 1978), provide as follows:
(1) Neither the Commission nor the Board is authorized under this chapter, by
rule or regulation, to require any issuer of municipal securities, directly or indirectly
through a purchaser or prospective purchaser of securities from the issuer, to file with
the Commission or the Board prior to the sale of such securities by the issuer any
application, report, or document in connection with the issuance, sale, or distribution
of such securities.
(2)The Board is not authorized under this chapter to require any issuer of municipal
securities, directly or indirectly through a municipal securities broker or municipal
securities dealer or otherwise, to furnish to the Board or to a prospective purchaser of
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City" and the ensuing investigation by the Commission,'5 as well as
severe financial difficulties experienced by other municipal issuers'
have spawned renewed controversy. The Municipal Finance Offi-
cers Association proposed disclosure guidelines for offerings of mu-
nicipal securities in 1976. " Additionally, bills were introduced in the
such securities any application, report, document, or information with respect to such
issuer: Provided, however, That the Board may require municipal securities brokers
and municipal securities dealers to furnish to the Board or purchasers or prospective
purchasers of municipal securities applications, reports, documents, and information
with respect to the issuer thereof which is generally available from a source other than
such issuer. Nothing in this paragraph shall be construed to impair or limit the power
of the Commission under any provision of this chapter.
14. In the early 1960's, the City of New York ("the city") began to have annual budget
deficits. These deficits were financed by deficit borrowing. The city first drained its "rainy
day fund" and periodically relieved itself of the obligation to replenish it. Shortly thereafter
short-term budget notes and, beginning in 1965, revenue anticipation notes were issued. State
legislation was passed broadening the categories of expected revenues against which these
anticipation notes could be issued. N.Y. LOCAL FIN. LAW §§ 25.00(c)(2), 25.00(d)(3) (McKin-
ney Supp. 1978). The city also issued tax anticipation notes which, when anticipated real
estate taxes were not collected, were rolled over. Nor was the city's deficit financing restricted
to short-term borrowing. By 1970 the city had begun to include current expenses in its capital
budget financed by longer term bonds. In 1975 asmuch as one-half of the capital budget was
used to finance operations. During this time overall debt limits were evaded by arrangements
with Mitchell-Lama housing projects and public benefit corporations whose debt issues were
not counted against city limits.
By late 1975 the City was on the brink of default. In June of 1975 the State Legislature
created the Municipal Assistance Corporation, a state instrumentality, to assist the City by
exchanging its securities for those of the city. N.Y. PuB. AuTH. LAW §§ 3030-3040 (McKinney.
Supp. 1978). Exchange offers were made in November 1975 and again in May 1976. However,
the city's slide to default continued. In November 1975 the State passed moratorium legisla-
tion permitting the city to suspend payments for three years on its short-term notes. New
York State Emergency Moratorium Act for the City of New York, 1975 N.Y. Laws, ch. 874,
as amended by 1976 N.Y. Laws, ch. 875 at 22-26. However, this legislation was subsequently
found unconstitutional in Flushing Nat'l Bank v. Municipal Assisttance Corp., 40 N.Y.2d
731, 358 N.E.2d 848, 390 N.Y.S.2d 22 (1976). Debt service payments were resumed in 1977.
See Committee on Municipal Affairs of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York,
Proposals to Strengthen Local Finance Laws in New York State, 34 THE'REcoiw 58, 105-24
(Jan./Feb. 1979, No. 1/2) [hereinafter cited as PROPOSALS]; Comment, Municipal Bonds: If
Default Is Here, Can Disclosure Be Far Behind?, 41 ALB. L. REv. 545, 546-48 (1977).
15. SEC Final Report in the Matter of Transactions in the Securities of the City of New
York, [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 81,936 (Feb. 5, 1979).
16. See generally J. Peterson, Changing Conditions in the Market for State and Local
Government Debt (prepared for the Joint Economic Committee of Congress) (1976); R. PET-
TENGIL & J. UPPAL, CAN CITIES SURVIVE? (1974).
17. Municipal Finance Officers Association, Disclosure Guidelines for Offerings of Securi-
ties by State and Local Governments (1976) [hereinafter "the MFOA Guidelines"].
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Senate and House during 1975 and 197618 that would subject muni-
cipal issuers to the registration and periodic reporting requirements
of the federal securities laws by deleting the exemption of municipal
securities provided in section 3(a)(2) of the Securities Act. " A more
carefully drawn legislative response sponsored by Senators Williams
and Tower" in 1976 and reintroduced, as revised, in 1977 by Sena-
tors Williams, Proxmire and Javits2 1 mandates specific disclosures
by issuers of municipal securities prior to an offer or sale and an-
nually thereafter in form and detail and in accordance with account-
ing standards prescribed by the Commission. Liabilities of partici-
pants in the distribution process are patterned after, but not as
extensive as, those under the Securities Act." Importantly however,
the Commission is not empowered to review disclosure documents
or to delay issues. Another bill23 would remove most industrial de-
velopment bonds 2 from the separate disclosure and liability provi-
sions of the Williams Bill and subject them, as "conceptually indis-
tinguishable from other corporate debt securities, '25 to the full re-
quirements of the federal securities laws.
18. S. 2574, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); H.R. 11044, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); H.R.
11534, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976).
. 19. 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(2) (1970). The three bills, as introduced by Senator Eagleton and
Representative Solarz, each would replace the present section 3(a)(2) exemption with a new
section 3(d) empowering the Commission to exempt by rule or regulation municipal securities
other than industrial development bonds. Other technical amendments to the Securities Act
and the Securities Exchange Act are contained variously in the bills.
20. Municipal Securities Full Disclosure Act of 1976, S. 2969, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976).
21. Municipal Securities Full Disclosure Act of 1977, S. 2339, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977)
[hereinafter "the Williams Bill"].
22. Section 11 of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1970), imposes civil liability on
issuers, directors or partners of issuers, named experts and underwriters for material misstate-
menis or omissions in registration statements filed in connection with distribution's of non-
exempt securities issues. These liabilities are subject to the defense of (a) knowledge of the
purchaser prior to purchase, and (b) the defenses of persons other than the issuer based on
"due diligence" in the preparation or investigation of statements in the registration state-
ment.
Section 12, 15 U.S.C. § 771 (1970), permits suit by purchasers against their immediate
sellers for (1) violation of the registration and prospectus delivery requirements of section 5,
15 U.S.C. § 77e (1970), or for (2) material untruths or omissions in any written or oral
communication of which the seller either knows or should have known, with the burden of
proof as to this later issue on the seller.
23. Industrial Development Bond Act, S. 3323, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978).
24. Industrial Development Bonds are defined in note 107 infra.
25. 124 CONG. REC., S113388 (daily ed. July 20, 1978).
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Against this background the Committee on Municipal Affairs of
the Association of the Bar of the City of New York undertook the
Local Finance Project to study the debt, budget and disclosure prac-
tices of municipalities in New York State. The Committee Report
of November, 1978 concluded that state regulation was preferable
to federal regulation as provided for in the Senate and House Bills
described above and as called for by the Commission in its report
on its investigation of New York City. The Committee Report set
forth "Proposed Disclosure Legislation." 6 The proposed require-
ments with respect to financial and other disclosures comprise rec-
:ommended revisions to New York's Local Finance Law27 and Gen-
eral Municipal Law28 in an attempt to construct a comprehensive
system of financial disclosure by local government entities within
the framework of existing state reporting mechanisms.
The Disclosuie Proposals rely on three elements to achieve this
goal: (i) a disclosure document (the "Official Statement") to pro-
vide investors information in connection with the issuance of obliga-
tions by a local entity, (ii) summarized periodic reporting (the
"Summary Annual Report"), and (iii) timely independent exami-
nation of financial practices and accounts. No civil liabilities are
created; rather enforcement and executive authority is vested in the
office of the state comptroller. While present state requirements
and the voluntary practices of localities already perform, to varying
degrees, many of these functions, the Disclosure Proposals are de-
signed to standardize practices in a manner least likely to disrupt
or burden governmental operations.
This article will briefly survey the existing mechanisms - pri-
marily stemming from federal law - that currently result in finan-
cial disclosure (such as it is) in connection with the offering and sale
to the public of securities of New York municipal issuers.29 As alter-
native models for regimes of municipal issuer financial disclosure,
the MFOA Guidelines, the federal Williams Bill and Industrial
Bond Act and New York's Disclosure Proposals will be described
26. PROPOSED FISCAL MONITOR LEGISLATION, Proposals, supra note 14, at 101-05 (Reprinted
in Appendix C).
27. N.Y. LOCAL FIN. LAW §§ 51.00, 57.00, 60.00 (McKinney Supp. 1978).
28. N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW §§ 30, 33 (McKinney 1977). Also proposed is a new § 31-a,
PROPOSED FISCAL MONITOR LEGISLATION § 3, Proposals, supra note 14, at 121.
29. See pt. II. infra.
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and compared."0 Ultimately this article concludes that, although the
isolated purpose of protecting investors in a municipal securities
market that is largely national could most effectively be pursued by
the imposition of uniform disclosure requirements through federal
law, the Disclosure Proposals are not demonstrably inadequate to
this purpose, and concludes finally that the intrusion into the affairs
of the state and local governments of New York that would accom-
pany the federal law approach makes the enactment of the Disclo-
sure Proposals a far more attractive alternative.3
II. Federal Regulation of the Municipal Securities Market
Prior to 1975, only the antifraud provisions of the securities laws
were applicable to municipal securities transactions.3" Section
3(a)(2) of the Securities Act exempts municipal securities from the
registration, prospectus delivery and disclosure requirements of that
Act. Professionals dealing exclusively in municipal securities were
exempted from the registration and financial responsibility require-
ments of section 15(a)(1) 31 and from the bookkeeping and record-
keeping requirements of section 17 of the Securities Exchange Act,34
due to the exemption then contained in section 3(a)(12).3 1 During
this period there was growing evidence of illegal sales practices:
Perusal of the Commission's complaints ... reveals a disturbing pattern of
professional misconduct by a significant number of broker-dealers. This pat-
tern is characterized by unconscionable mark-ups, churning of customers'
accounts, misrepresentations concerning the nature and value of municipal
securities, disregard of suitability standards, and scandalous high pressure
sales techniques. The selling practices of these firms involved all the charac-
teristics of the classic 'boiler room' operation. These practices are intended
to induce hasty investment decisions with respect to securities unfamiliar to
potential customers. Furthermore, it appears that certain firms exerted ex-
traordinary pressures on their salesmen to increase sales without regard to
the welfare of the firm's customers. In some instances, bonds have been
30. See pt. III infra.
31. See pt. IV infra.
32. See note 3 supra. Sections 11 and 12(1) of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. §§
77k, 771(1) (1970), do not apply because registration under section 5, 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1970),
is not required; section 12(2) of that Act, 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1970), which applies whether or
not a registration statement is employed, specifically exempts municipal securities.
33. 15 U.S.C. § 78o(a)(1) (Supp. 1978).
34. 15 U.S.C. § 78q (Supp. 1978).
35. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(12) (1970).
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promoted as general obligation bonds of the issuer whereas, in fact, they have
been revenue bonds, sometimes in default."
Nevertheless, the Commission was active in bringing actions
against defalcating professionals under the "shingle theory"37 devel-
oped under rule 10b-5. For example, in Walston & Co. and
Harrington,38 the Commission instituted an administrative proceed-
ing against a registered broker-dealer and its divisional bond man-
ager, alleging that the defendants' conduct violated the antifraud
provisions of the securities laws. The broker-dealer and its manager
made no independent investigation of the bond issue in question
beyond a routine portfolio review, and the only information pro-
vided the broker-dealer's securities salesmen was contained in an
offering circular adapted by the manager from a prior misleading
offering circular issued by the principal underwriter. The salesmen
relied on the information given and made recommendations that the
bonds were "good" or "high-grade" or "secure" tax-free municipal
bonds.
The Commission's decision held that firms participating in an
offering and dealers recommending municipal bonds as "good mu-
nicipal bonds" have a duty "to make diligent inquiry, investigation
and disclosure as to material facts relating to the issuer of the secur-
ities and bearing on the ability of the issuer to service such bonds."39
The Commission also held that "dealers offering such bonds to the
public [must] make certain that the offering circulars and other
selling literature are based upon an adequate investigation so that
they accurately reflect all material facts which a prudent investor
should know in order to evaluate the offering before reaching an
investment decision."" Holding that the offering circulars did not
36. SENATE COMM. ON BANKING, HOUSING AND URBAN AFFAIRS S. REP. No. 75, 94th Cong.,
1st Sess. 43 (1975).
37. In a variety of circumstances professionals who sell public securities are said to make
implicit representations to their customers. The SEC has maintained that "a broker-dealer
who goes into business ... impliedly represents that he will deal fairly and competently with
his customers and that he will have an adequate basis for any statements or recommendations
which he makes concerning securities." Charles Hughes & Co. v. SEC, 139 F.2d 434 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 321 U.S. 786 (1943). See also Berko v. SEC, 316 F.2d 137 (2d Cir. 1963); Kahn
v. SEC, 297 F.2d 112 (2d Cir. 1961); Sanders v. John Nuveen & Co., 524 F.2d 1064, 1071 (7th
Cir. 1975), vacated and remanded, 425 U.S. 929 (1976).
38. [1966-1967 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 77,474 (1967).
39. Id. at 82,944-45.
40. Id. at 82,945.
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meet this disclosure criterion, the Commission held that the broker-
dealer and its manager willfully violated and willfully aided and
abetted violations of section 17(a) of the Securities Act and sections
10(b) and 15(c)(1) of the Securities Exchange Act.4
In another administrative proceeding 2 the Commission took the
position that "[the antifraud] provisions contemplate, at the least,
that recommendations of a security made to proposed purchasers
shall have a reasonable basis and that they shall be accompanied
by disclosure of known or easily ascertainable facts bearing upon the
justification for the representations."43 Additionally, the Commis-
sion has taken the position that a broker-dealer who sells a security
exempted from the registration requirements of the Securities Act
may incur a greater obligation to determine the suitability of the
investment because the customer is not afforded the added protec-
tion of the registration process." Overall between 1971 and 1975 the
Commission brought injunctive actions against seventy-two de-
fendants to halt fraudulent municipal securities practices. 5
Based on evidence developed in these and other actions, in 1975
Congress determined to subject underwriters and broker-dealers of
municipal securities to the full panoply of direct federal regulation."
The exemption in section 3(a)(12) of the Securities Exchange
Act'7 was narrowed to provide that municipal securities would no
longer be deemed "exempt securities" for purposes of the broker-
dealer registration requirements and the antifraud provisions relat-
ing to the over-the-counter market contained in section 15,11 the
self-regulatory rules of section 15A11 (except for certain subsections
thereof) and inclusion in the nationwide clearance systemos provided
for in section 17A.50 All municipal securities dealers, including
41. Id. at 82,946.
42. Best Securities, Inc., 39 SEC 931 (1960).
43. Id. at 934.
44. SEC Securities Act Release No. 4445, reprinted in 2 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 22,753
(1962). An extensive discussion of the "suitability" doctrine is set forth in 6 L. Loss, SECURI-
TIES REGULATION, 3708-27 (Supp. 1969).
45. See note 36 supra.
46. See note 11 supra. See generally Note, Legislation: Securities Act Amendments of
1975, 29 OKLA. L. REv. 462 (1976).
47. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(12) (Supp. 1978).
48. 15 U.S.C. § 78o (Supp. 1978).
49. 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3 (Supp. 1978).
50. 15 U.S.C. § 78q-1 (Supp. 1978).
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banks buying and selling other than for their own account,5' were
required to register under section 15B(a)(1). 2 In addition, section 17
of the Securities Exchange Act53 was amended to provide that re-
cords of municipal securities professionals be subject to Commission
inspection.
Carried over from section 15A was the concept of a self-regulatory
association to which all brokers and dealers would belong. Section
15B(b)(1) 54 established the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board
(hereinafter "the MSRB") and empowered it to adopt rules con-
cerning, among other things, professional qualifications, fair trad-
ing, arbitration of claims, form and content of published quotations
and recordkeeping practices. To date, the MSRB has adopted a
series of Administrative, Definitional and thirty-five General Rules
covering much of the ambit of the statutory mandate.5 Pursuant to
rule G-32s1 concerning new issues, a broker or dealer must furnish
its customer, at the time the confirmation of sale is sent, a copy of
any disclosure statement prepared by the issuer. The Commission
is empowered to enforce MSRB rules by order, censure, suspension
and revocation of registration."?
As a result of the 1975 amendments municipal securities profes-
sionals became subject to the full arsenal of the Commission's en-
forcement powers, including administrative discipline, equitable
actions, and possible criminal prosecution. While liability in dam-
ages may be limited by the application of the scienter requirement
of Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder" to actions. brought by private par-
ties, the Supreme Court explicitly left open the question whether
51. Section 3(a)(30) of the Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(30) (Supp. 1978).
52. 15 U.S.C. § 78o-4(a)(1) (Supp. 1978).
53. 15 U.S.C. § 78q (Supp. 1978).
54. 15 U.S.C. § 78o-4(b)(1) (Supp. 1978).
55. The MSRB rules are published in the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board
Manual (CCH).
56. Id., T 3656.
57. Section 15B(c) of the Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78o-4(c) (Supp. 1978).
58. Scienter was defined by the Court as "a mental state embracing intent to deceive,
manipulate, or defraud." Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 194 n.12 (1977). The
First Circuit has defined "intent to deceive" as saying "something, that is expected to be
relied on, that is not believed to be true, or, if strictly true, is hoped will be understood in an
untruthful sense." SEC v. World Radio Mission, Inc., 544 F.2d 535, 540 (1st Cir. 1976). See
also Sanders v. John Nuveen & Co., 554 F.2d 790, 792-97 (7th Cir. 1977).
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scienter would be required in other actions. 9 Since that time the
Courts of Appeals have split on the issue,10 with the Second Circuit
most recently deciding unequivocally in the negative:
[Tihe language and history of. . .[section 10(b) does] not require a show-
ing of scienter in an injunction enforcement action brought by the Commis-
sion .... In view of the policy considerations underlying the securities acts
it has been our view that the increased effectiveness of government enforce-
ment actions predicated on a showing of negligence alone outweighed the
danger of potential harm to those enjoined from violating the securities
laws. . . .The essential nature of an SEC enforcement action is equitable
and prophylactic, its primary purpose is to protect the public from harm, not
to punish the offender.".
The amendments did not, however, revoke the exemptions ac-
corded municipal issuers under the securities laws. Sections
15B(d)(1) and 15B(d)(2) specifiy that neither the Commission nor
the MSRB is authorized to require any issuer, directly or indirectly,
either to file before sale or to furnish afterwards any application,
report, document or information."
This continuing exemption for issuers raises disturbing questions
for underwriters and broker-dealers. Under section 15B(d)(2), the
MSRB may require municipal securities professionals to furnish to
it and to prospective purchasers only that information as to issuers
"which is generally available from a source other than such is-
suer. 61 3 Because issuers themselves are not to be held to any direct
or indirect disclosure requirements, it can be argued that underwri-
ters and broker-dealers should not be required to investigate or dis-
close any other then publicly available information. Alternatively,
section 15(d)(2) can be narrowly construed as intended merely to
prevent the MSRB from requiring any direct or indirect disclosure
from an issuer; whatever disclosure and investigation compelled
otherwise by the antifraud provisions of the securities acts (rather
59. 425 U.S. at 194 n.12.
60. Compare SEC v. Blatt, 583 F.2d 1325, 1333 (5th Cir. 1978) and Edward J. Mawod &
Co. v. SEC, 591 F.2d 588, 595 (10th Cir. 1979) (requiring scienter) with SEC v. Arthur Young
& Co., 590 F.2d 785, 787 (9th Cir. 1979) (court assumes negligence would suffice, without
deciding) and SEC v. World Radio Mission, Inc., 544 F.2d 535, 540-41 (1st Cir. 1976).
61. SEC v. Aaron, [Current] FED. SEC. L. REp. (CCH) 96,800 at 95,128 (2d Cir. March
12, 1979).
62. See note 13 supra.
63. 15 U.S.C. § 78o-4(d)(2) (Supp. 1978).
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than by MSRB rules) would still be required of underwriters and
broker-dealers. The Commission asserted its intention to enforce
this narrower construction in its first release concerning the 1975
amendments." Under the "shingle theory," 5 the due diligence re-
quirements of section 11 of the Securities Act 6 have been read into
the antifraud provisions.
For example, in Bache Halsey, Stuart, Inc., 7 the Commission
found, based on the offer of settlement from Bache Halsey, Stuart,
Inc. ("Bache"), that Bache had been the underwriter for a $4.8
million industrial development bond offering to finance the modern-
ization of a custom dyeing business. Following the offering Bache
maintained a market in the bonds and purchased and sold the
bonds to its retail customers. During this time Bache did not pro-
vide its customers with current information regarding the financial
position of the company. In fact, the company's financial condition
was deteriorating, and eighteen months after the offering the com-
pany filed a petition in bankruptcy.
The Commission further found that in connection with the origi-
nal offering and with subsequent purchases and sales of the bonds
in the after market, the defendants had directly and indirectly mis-
represented material facts and failed to disclose material facts con-
cerning among other things: (i) the lack of essential information
about the security, (ii) the risks which arose from the lack of infor-
mation, (iii) the failure to make an independent investigation of the
security, (iv) the lack of an adequate and reasonable basis for rec-
ommending the security, (v) the failure to disclose facts which were
known and those which were reasonably ascertainable, (vi) the lack
of reasonable basis for making a market and establishing the market
price for the security, (vii) the safety and risk of an investment in
the security, (viii) the adverse financial condition of the company
and (ix) "other statements and omissions of similar purport and
object."
Based on the foregoing, the Commission concluded that Bache
and one of its principals violated section 17(a) of the Securities Act
64. Securities Exchange Act Release No. 11,876 (Nov. 26, 1975).
65. See note 37 supra.
66. 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1971).
67. Securities Exchange Act Release No. 12,847, reprinted in [1976-1977 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 80,748 (1976).
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and section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act and rule 10b-5
promulgated thereunder. 8 In connection with the settlement, a
sixty-day injunction against all trading by Bache of industrial de-
velopment bonds was suspended subject to a partial reimbursement
by Bache of customer losses and the establishment of internal oper-
ating procedures to safeguard the public investing in industrial de-
velopment bonds."
In the Matter of Lawrence A. Luebbe (Benchmark Securities,
Inc.), 0 the president of a broker-dealer was found to have violated
the antifraud provisions by recommending and selling general obli-
gation bond anticipation notes issued by a California public agency
without having made a reasonable and diligent inquiry into the
issuer's financial condition. Respondent's explanation that he had
relied on oral statements from a municipal securities dealer regard-
ing the issuer's assets and liabilities was rejected as an inadequate
substitute for review of reliable written financial data. Although
respondent also argued that current financial reports were not avail-
able, the Commission answered that under those circumstances the
notes should not have been sold at all.
Under the theories of these and other decisions,7' underwriters
and broker-dealers are held to duties of investigation and disclosure
comparable to those imposed on their counterparts in the corporate
securities market without any accompanying disclosure obligations
on the part of municipal securities issuers. Exposed to liabilities of
the sort exemplified by these decisions," municipal securities indiis-
try professionals have extracted increased disclosures from issuers.73
68. See note 3 supra.
69. A private action arising from the same transaction is Scarfarotti v. Bache & Co., 438
F. Supp. 199 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
70. Admin. Proc. File No. 3-5175, [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
1I 81,348 (1977).
71. Other recent Commission actions against broker-dealers include Charles Michael
West, Admin. Proc. File No. 3-5255, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 15,454 (Jan. 2,
1979); Midwest Securities Co., Admin. Proc. File No. 3-5391, Securities Exchange Act Re-
lease No. 14,919 (July 3, 1978); Richard C. Flick, Admin. Proc. File No. 3-5256, Securities
Exchange Act Release No. 14,629 (April 3, 1978).
72. See generally Doty, Application of the Antifraud Provisions of the Federal Securities
Laws to Exempt Offerings: Duties of Underwriters and Counsel, 15 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REV.
393 (1975); Johnson & Wheeler, Securities Law Duties of Bond Counsel, 1976 DUKE L.J. 1205.
73. See Klapper & Pappas, Wall Street is Forcing Cities to Disclose More When Floating
Bonds, Wall St. J. June 30, 1977, at 1, col. 1.
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One study conducted in 1976 compared the disclosures made in
offering statements of issues sold in October and November of 1975
to those in May and June of 1976.11 While that study may have come
too closely upon the publicity surrounding New York City in 1975
to reflect solely the legal developments described in this article,
nevertheless its findings reflect what its authors describe as a dra-
matic increase in the overall level of voluntary disclosure. 5
III. Disclosure By Issuers
There seems to be widespread agreement among members of the
municipal securities industry, government regulators and commen-
tators that mechanisms and standards for disclosure by municipal
issuers must be created to "provide the basis for a clearer under-
standing by issuers and other participants in the municipal securi-
ties markets of their responsibilities and . . . to assure that public
disclosures by municipalities are reliable and accurate." 6
A. The Municipal Finance Officers Association's Guidelines
Comprehensive disclosure proposals were released in December
1976 by the Municipal Finance Officers Association.77 The MFOA's
Disclosure Guidelines for Offerings of Securities by State and Local
Governments78 are not intended to be legally binding, but
"represent information that usually should be included in official
statements because it would be relevant to investors on most occa-
sions for most issuers."7 Because of the many differences in the size
of municipal issuers and the terms and provisions of municipal se-
74. Peterson, Doty, Forbes & Bourque, Searching for Standards: Disclosure in the Munici-
pal Securities Market, 1976 DUKE L.J. 1177.
75. Id. at 1196.
76. Securities & Exchange Comm., Final Report in the Matter of Transactions in the
Securities of the City of New York, reprinted in [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 81,936
at 81,244 (Feb. 5, 1979).
77. The Municipal Finance Officers Association ("MFOA") is an organization represent-
ing various issuers of municipal securities.
78. The Disclosure Guidelines (hereinafter "the MFOA Guidelines") were followed by
"Guidelines for Use by State and Local Governments in the Preparation of Yearly Informa-
tion Statements and Other Current Information" and "Procedural Statements in Connection
With the Disclosure Guidelines for Offerings of Securities by State and Local Governments
and the Guidelines for Use by State and Local Governments in the Preparation of Yearly
Information Statements and Other Current Information" (May 1978).
79. MFOA Guidelines, supra note 78, at Preface and Introduction.
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curities, the MFOA Guidelines do not exhaustively list all disclosure
items; rather they call for concise, complete and accurate presenta-
tion of those matters material to the type of issue to be made avail-
able in an official statement preceding the issue of a municipal
security. 0 With allowance for these variations, the MFOA Guide-
lines contemplate: (1) a cover page and introduction cross-
referencing the most salient details of the issue; (2) a description of
the securities being offered, including use of the funds raised and
provisions for repayment; (3) background information regarding the
issuer, such as population and economic data, legal government
structure, services and facilities (and regarding the "enterprise"
central to a revenue bond data encompassing facilities, feasibility
reports, operations, customers, legal structure and officers); (4) de-
scriptions of debt structure, debt service requirements and legal
debt and tax limits; (5) financial information as to operations for
each of the last five years and as to assets and liabilities for the two
most recent years, descriptions of accounting practices, budgetary
processes, and tax collection procedures, detail pertaining to valua-
tion of taxable property, cash flow supporting interim borrowing or
derived from nonrecurring revenue sources, pension plan liabilities
and other specific information, as well as basic financial statements
for the last two years prepared in accordance with generally ac-
cepted accounting principles;" (6) descriptions of material legal
proceedings and other legal matters; (7) ratings information and (8)
other matters, including provision for distribution of the official
statement and other pertinent documents.
While early data indicates some measure of acceptance of the
MFOA Guidelines by municipal issuers," the American Bar Asso-
ciation Committee on State and Local Government's Subcommittee
on Municipal and Governmental Obligations has criticized the
basic approach. 3 Rather than relying on a pre-offering official state-
80. Id.
81. As suggested by the following sources: AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF CERTIFIED PUBLIC AC-
COUNTANTS, AUDITS OF STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNITS (1974); NATIONAL COUNCIL ON
GOVERNMENTAL ACCOUNTING, AUDITING, AND FINANCIAL REPORTING (1968).
82. See Peterson, Doty, Forbes & Bourque, Searching for Standards: Disclosure in the
Municipal Securities Market, 1976 DUKE L.J. 1177, 1182-204.
83. Letter from Richard B. Smith, of the American Bar Assoc. to the MFOA (Feb. 5,
1976). See Note, Disclosure by Issuers of Municipal Securities: An Analysis of Recent Propos-
als and a Suggested Approach, 29 VAND. L. REV. 1017, 1035-37 (1976).
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ment, the ABA urges emphasis on the preparation of a comprehen-
sive annual report to be supplemented by a shorter document in
relation to a particular issue. This mechanism is incorporated in
legislation introduced in the Congress in 197684 and 1977. 81
B. The Williams Bill
The Williams Bill would amend the Securities Exchange Act,
principally by adding a new section 13A. This section would require
issuers with aggregate outstanding municipal securities exceeding
$50,000,000 to prepare, but not to file with the Commission, annual
reports and reports of events of default containing certain financial
and other information." In addition, issuers would also be required
prior to the offer or sale of new municipal securities to prepare a
distribution document including such data from the annual reports
as the Commission may prescribe, along with specified additional
information concerning the particular offering." The Bill requires
that the periodic reports and distribution document be made avail-
able to investors upon request and, in the latter case, to brokers and
dealers.88 The Commission is directed to create an advisory commit-
tee including representatives of municipal issuers, whose recom-
mendations as to -exemptions, accounting standards and disclosure
84. The Municipal Securities Full Disclosure Act of 1976, S. 2969, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1976).
85. The Municipal Securities Full Disclosure Act of 1977, S. 2339, 95th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1977) (hereinafter cited as Williams Bill).
86. Williams Bill, supra note 85, § 13A(b)(1) contains the reporting requirement. Section
13A(b)(2) enumerates items to be included, encompassing descriptions of: the issuer's struc-
ture, facilities and operations; material changes in operations; borrowing policies and trends,
debt structure, legal limits and any defaults in the past twenty years; taxing authority, legal
limits, tax structure and collection experience for the 'ast five years, major taxpayers and
other revenue sources including Federal or other governmental assistance; material demo-
graphic and economic data and trends; legal proceedings; budget data and procedures; pen-
sion plan liabilities and holdings of issuer securities by associated trusts or funds and finan-
cial statements for up to the last five years. Financial statements would be required to be
audited and reported on by independent certified public accountants, a qualified indepen-
dent or licensed accountant, or an examiner from an independent state agency. Sections
13A(b)(3) and 13A(b)(4) authorize the Commission to add to these requirements.
87. The Williams Bill requires the following information in addition to that provided in
the annual report: amount and price of securities offered; identity of underwriters, nature of'
underwriting arrangements and remuneration of underwriters; other costs and expenses of the
issue; purposes of the funds; terms and provisions of the offered securities; counsel's opinion;
ratings statement plus other items as required by the Commission. Id. § 13A(c)(2).
88. Id. § 13A(f).
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items, along with those of the MSRB, are to be considered by the
Commission."' The Commission is granted extensive authority to
,prescribe by rule or regulation the accounting standards and prac-
tices to be followed in the preparation of financial statements, as
well as the detail and form of such statements."
In addition, the Williams Bill expressly imposes civil liabilities
on issuers, experts, underwriters and broker-dealers to purchasers
of municipal securities for material untrue statements or omissions
in the distribution document, other communications and annual
reports." The liabilities are similar to those provided in sections 11
and 12 of the Securities Act" and section 18 of the Securities Ex-
change Act. 3 Various differences from pre-existing legislation per-
taining to corporate securities are worth noting. The exception con-
tained in section 11(b)(3)(A) of the Securities Act 4 to the general
duty of reasonable investigation as to parts of the registration state-
ment "purporting to be made on the authority of a public official
document or statement" is not, for obvious reasons, carried over to
new section 13A as to documents or statements of the issuer. Due
diligence requirements of underwriters are made to depend upon
89. Id. § 13A(n).
90. Id. § 13A(e).
91. Section 13A(g)(1) enables any purchaser of a municipal security to sue the issuer (but
not officers or employees thereof), experts and underwriters. Section 13A(g) (2) establishes the
responsibilities of the various offering participants to assure the accuracy of the distribution
document which, if discharged, provide defenses to investor suits. Issuers, underwriters in
negotiated offerings and experts are absolved if they had, "after reasonable investigation,
reasonable grounds to believe and did believe . . . that the statements . . . were true and
that there was no omission to state a material fact . . . necessary to make the statement
[sic] not misleading." In the case of municipal securities sold through competitive bid
underwriting, the underwriter would be held to a lesser standard requiring only that it had
no reasonable ground to believe and did not believe that there were untrue statements or
omissions in the distribution documents with no apparent obligation to investigate. Section
13A(g) (3)-(7) duplicate provisions of section 11(c)-(e) relating to the standard of reasonable-
ness and to timing issues. Section 13A(h) corresponds to section 12, and section 13A(i) to
section 18 of the Securities Exchange Act. Section 13A(1) provides a statute of limitations
comparable to section 13 of the Securities Act. Section 13A(m) provides for concurrent state
and federal court jurisdiction comparable to that provided in section 22(a) of the Securities
Act, except that suits against the issuer are restricted to those district or districts where the
issuer is located. Finally, sections 13A(g)(8) and 13A(i) provide that these express civil actions
are exclusive.
92. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k, 771 (1970).
93. 15 U.S.C. § 78r (1970).
94. 15 U.S.C. § 77k(b)(3)(A) (1970).
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whether the issue is negotiated or purchased through competitive
bidding. 5 In the latter case a requirement of independent investiga-
tion by underwriters "would be unreasonably expensive and unduly
disruptive."" Unlike corporate issuers under section 11, a municipal
issuer would not have absolute liability for any defective disclosure
contained in the distribution document and would be liable only for
failure to investigate properly the statements originated by it." Offi-
cers and employees of the issuer would not be held personally lia-
ble. 8 Finally, another defense for all offering participants provided
in the Bill conditions the right of recovery on proof that the plaintiff
acquiring the security relied upon the alleged untrue statement in
the distribution document or relied upon the distribution document
and did not know of the alleged omission, but permits such reliance
to be established without proof that the purchaser read the distribu-
tion document."The Bill does not provide for Commission staff review of munici-
pal securities distribution documents (or annual reports), recogniz-
ing that such review would be outside the Commission's area of
expertise, would require a considerable increase in its budget and
might raise constitutional problems if a delay in the Commission's
review prejudiced a public sale of securities the proceeds of which
were to be an essential part of the issuer's budget."°" In addition, the
95. See note 91 supra. The large majority of municipal securities (79% in 1975) are under-
written through the competitive bidding process. The laws of many states require competitive
bidding, and even in states permitting negotiated sales that method is not generally employed
except for revenue bond and similar offerings. Generally the issuer prepares any offering
documentation without participation by underwriters, who may win the underwriting on bid
issues no more than 25% of the time. The time pressures of this process, the volume of issues,
the difficulty in obtaining much of the. background data, as well as the complexity of the
factors pertinent to the financial status of a municipality and the relative safety of municipal
issues have all contributed to limiting the independent investigation and participation in the
preparation of offering documentation by underwriters. The Bill, in eliminating the underwri-
ter's due diligence obligation in respect to competitively bid issues, reflects customary prac-
tice. See Proposed Amendments to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934: Hearings on S. 2574
& S. 2969 Before the Subcomm. on Securities of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing &
Urban Affairs, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976) (statement of the Dealer Bank Assoc. & Securities
Indus. Assoc.).
96. 123 CONG. Rac. S19,272 (daily ed. Dec. 1, 1977).
97. Williams Bill, supra note 85, § 13A(g)(2)(A).
98. 123 CONG. REc. S19272 (daily ed. Dec. 1, 1977).
99. Williams Bill, supra note 85, § 13A(g)(1)(c).
100.. See Address by Roberta S. Karmel, Commissioner, Securities and Exchange Com-
mission, to the Public Securities Association (Oct. 20, 1978).
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Bill exempts from the annual report and disclosure document re-
quirements (but not from the liability provisions) any municipal
issuer that is required by state law to make disclosures
"substantially similar" to those required by federal law.' Although
this exemption is meant to be "automatic" in the sense that the
state, and not the Commission, would determine the substantial
similarity of federal and state-mandated disclosure requirements,,"2
the Commission, as the ultimate arbiter of the content and form of
all disclosures under the Bill, would establish the criteria to which
state laws would have to conform.
C. The Industrial Development Bond Act
A second municipal securities disclosure bill was introduced in
the Senate in 1978. The "Industrial Development Bond Act"0 3
would, by incorporating the substantive provisions of rule 131104 into
Section 2(4) of the.Securities Act'"1 and by amending section 3(a)(2)
of that Act,'"1 subject industrial development bonds0 7 to the full
registration requirements of that Act. 08 Arguing that industrial de-
101. Williams Bill, supra note 85, § 13A(d).
102. 123 CONG. REc. S19271 (daily ed. Dec. 1, 1977).
103. S. 3323, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978).
104. 17 C.F.R. § 230.131 (1978).
105. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(4) (1970).
106. 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(2) (1970).
107. Industrial development bonds (or "industrial revenue bonds") are debt instru-
ments issued nominally by a governmental entity to finance the construction or acquis-
ition of a facility for ultimate use by a private business enterprise. The facility financed
by such bonds is the subject of a contractual agreement (typically a lease) between
the governmental entity and the private enterprise, providing for payments by the
latter to the former in an amount calculated to fully sustain debt service requirements
on the bonds. Principal and interest on the bonds is payable from the revenues received
by the governmental entity under the terms of its contractual agreement with the
private enterprise. The bonds are not backed by the general credit and taxing authority
of the governmental entity in whose name the bonds are issued; the governmental
entity is generally obligated on the bonds only to the extent of applying contract
revenues received from the private enterprise to the payment of bond principal and
interest.
124 CONG. REC. S11,391 (daily ed. July 20, 1978) (Statement of the Securities & Exchange
Comm.).
108. Currently almost all industrial revenue bonds are designed to qualify for the section
3(a) (2) exemption. This exemption is drawn in terms of reference to section 103 of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1954, as amended, which distinguishes, principally, among different pur-
poses to which the funds are put. In those cases where an industrial development bond does
not qualify under these provisions, the "industrial or commercial enterprise" involved is
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velopment bonds are "conceptually indistinguishable from other
corporate debt securities," the Commission maintained in its state-
ment to Congress in support of the bill that "investors in industrial
development bonds which are payable from the profits of a commer-
cial enterprise should not be accorded fewer protections than those
provided to investors in other corporate bonds . . .,"101 However,
certain industrial bonds issued under specified conditions generally
involving essentially governmental projects"0 would continue to be
exempt from the Securities Act.
The bill would also amend the Securities Exchange Act and the
Trust Indenture Act of 1939"' to delete certain exemptions under
these laws. As "issuers" under new Section 2(4) of the Securities
Act, non-governmental participants (generally the lessee) in the
industrial development bond could become subject to the reporting
provisions of section 13 of the Securities Exchange Act"' through the
application of section 15(d) of that Act."' The SEC would be em-
powered to suspend trading under section 12(k) of the Securities
Exchange Act"' to enforce the periodic reporting requirement. The
exemption in section 304(a)(4) of the Trust Indenture Act"' would
be restricted comparably to that in section 3(a)(2) of the Securities
Act, thereby subjecting such bonds to the filing and qualification
provisions of the Trust Indenture Act.
One troubling aspect of the bill is that underwriters would be
required to conform to the full "due diligence" standard of section
11 of the Securities Act."' The lesser standard provided in the Wil-
liams Bill for competitively bid offerings is not carried over."7
considered to be the issuer of a "separate security" subject to the provisions of the Securities
Act, the Securities Exchange Act and the Trust Indenture Act, pursuant to rule 131 under
the Securities Act, 17 C.F.R. § 230.131 (1978), and rule 3b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.3b-5 (1978)
under the Securities Exchange Act.
109. 124 CONG. REc. S11,388 (daily ed. July 20, 1978).
110. Such as are currently exempted by rule 131(b), 17 C.F.R. § 230.131(b) (1978).
111. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77aaa-77bbb (1970) (hereinafter "the Trust Indenture Act").
112. 15 U.S.C. § 78m (Supp. 1978).
113. 15 U.S.C. § 78o(d) (Supp. 1978).
114. 15 U.S.C. § 781(k) (Supp. 1978).
115. 15 U.S.C. § 77ddd(a)(4) (1970).
116. 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1970).
117. See text accompanying notes 95-96 supra.
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D. The New York Disclosure Proposals
As an alternative to federal regulation under the Williams Bill,
or to provide mechanisms to qualify for the state regulation exemp-
tion.provided therein, New York State legislation has been proposed
by the Committee on Municipal Affairs of the Association of the Bar
of the City of New York (the "Disclosure Proposals"). The report of
the Committee, in reaction to the financial difficulties of New York
City and other localities,"' proposes extensive reforms to state law
in the areas of (1) limiting local debt and mandating repayment
within certain periods, (2) requiring disclosure to investors and (3)
establishing fiscal monitoring by the state comptroller. Like the
Williams Bill, the Disclosure Proposals require timely independent
examination of financial statements presented to the public in both
pre-distribution and periodic reports; however, these public report-
ing obligations are carefully meshed with existing and proposed
fiscal monitoring mechanisms in ways that lessen the burden on
local issuers and supplement state control over local financing.
Existing New York State legislation requires, in connection with
a public issue of securities, the filing of a Notice of Sale supplying
data relevant to the particular obligation being sold"' and of a Debt
Statement specifying debt-contracting power.' 2" A system of annual
reports is prescribed, providing a detailed analysis of operations in
a format fixed by the comptroller.' In addition, the comptroller's
office conducts periodic audits.'22
However, as a result of staff shortages the comptroller's audits
are performed only infrequently. The content and form, moreover,
of the required filings are not generally informative to investors.2 3
The Notice of Sale and Debt Statement do not permit meaningful
comparisons of issuers and securities, while the material included
in the annual reports is frequently too detailed and segmented to be
of use to investors determining whether to purchase or hold munici-
pal securities. As a result, market pressures have forced many local
118. Proposals, supra note 14, at 59-60.
119. N.Y. LOCAL FIN. LAW §§ 58.00, 60.00(e) (McKinney 1968 & Supp. 1978).
120. N.Y. LOCAL FIN. LAW § 109.00 (McKinney Supp. 1978).
121. N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW Art. 3 (McKinney 1977).
122. N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW §§ 33-38 (McKinney 1977).
123. Proposals, supra note 14, at 93.
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entities to go beyond existing legal requirements.' 4
The Disclosure Proposals contemplate the filing of an Official
Statement with the state comptroller prior to the sale of municipal
securities.2 5 Copies of the Official Statement are to be made avail-
able upon request. 16 While the comptroller must receive the Offi-
cial Statement prior to the public sale date, review by the comptrol-
ler is not required and the comptroller would not be empowered to
delay the sale because of any defective disclosures. ' 27 No new liabili-
ties are created, 12 nor would failure to file or to meet prescribed
informational requirements affect the validity of the securities is-
sued. 29 The burden on local issuers of preparing the Official State-
ment would be offset by the proposals for circulation by the Comp-
troller of prototype forms keyed to the type and size of the entity
issuing the securities 30 and for incorporation by reference (and at-
tachment to the Official Statement) of relevant portions of the
Summary Annual Report discussed below. 3'
The Disclosure Proposals do not attempt to fix by statute a de-
tailed listing of the information which would be included in the
Official Statement. The Committee Report, pointing to the varia-
tions among issuers subject to the law and to the many forms of debt
obligations issued, as well as the continuing evolution of disclosure
demands and norms, calls instead for a flexible format to be pre-
scribed by rule or order of the comptroller. 132 In prescribing the
informational content of the Official Statement, the comptroller is
directed to consider (and permitted to adopt entirely) "voluntary
disclosure standards promulgated by national organizations of local
governments.' 133 This provision refers to the MFOA Guidelines dis-
124. Id.
125. PROPOSED DISCLOSURE LEGISLATION §§ 2, 3, Proposals, supra note 14, at 115-18 (Re-
printed in Appendix B).
126. Id. The Committee Report expects distribution patterns will be established by un-
derwriters and dealers. Proposals, supra note 14, at 101.
127. Proposals, supra note 14, at 97-98.
128. PROPOSED DISCLOSURE LEGISLATION §§ 3, 4 Proposals, supra note 14, at 115-18 (Re-
printed in Appendix B).
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Proposals, supra note 14, at 109.
133. PROPOSED DISCLOSURE LEGISLATION §§ 2, 3, Proposals, supra note 14, at 115-18 (Re-
printed in Appendix B).
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cussed above.' Financial statements in the Official Statement are
to be prepared in accordance with the State Uniform System of
Accounts"3 5 or with generally accepted accounting practices, but
need not be audited.' 36
The comptroller is empowered to grant exemptions from the re-
quirement to file an Official Statement by rules or orders of general
or particular applicability. The comptroller is directed to consider
"(a) the aggregate principal amount of the bonds to be issued; or
(b) the nature of the offerees and the number and value of the
purchasers of such bonds."'37 The Committee Report urges exemp-
tion when the cost of preparing the Official Statement dispropor-
tionately outweighs the informational benefits afforded a limited
group of investors in a short-term or limited size offering.' 3
In addition, the Disclosure Proposals would supplement the exist-
ing provision for filing annual reports with the comptroller' 9 by
requiring the preparation and filing of a Summary Annual Report
summarizing the more detailed financial information in the annual
report and including narrative descriptions of material develop-
ments and trends. The Summary Annual Report is designed to ena-
ble investors to compare different issuers and present against past
financial conditions. The comptroller is empowered to prescribe the
form and content of the Summary Annual Report and to exempt
by rule or order.' 4' It is expected that much of the financial data can
be drawn from annual reports already on file in the comptroller's
Office, which might also assist in the development of pertinent de-
mographic and economic data."'
The Summary Annual Report must be filed within sixty days
(four months in the case of New York City)"43 after the close of the
134. See text accompanying notes 77-82 supra.
135. Prescribed by the comptroller pursuant to N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 36 (McKinney
1977).
136. PROPOSED DISCLOSURE LEGISLATION §§ 2, 3, Proposals, supra note 14, at 115-18 (Re-
printed in Appendix B).
137. Id.
138. Proposals, supra note 14, at 98.
139. N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 30 (McKinney Supp. 1978).
140. Proposed General Municipal Law § 31-a(3).
141. Id. at § 31-a(8).
142. Proposals, supra note 14, at 99.
143. N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 30(5) (McKinney 1977).
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fiscal year if the report contains unaudited financial statements, in
which case the comptroller will audit the financials within six
months.' Alternatively, a locality would be permitted up to 150
days after the close of the fiscal year to report if the financial state-
ments were audited by independent certified public accountants.'45
Unlike the Williams Bill, the Disclosure Proposals do not deline-
ate investigatory responsibilities of underwriters and broker-
dealers, nor do they create statutory liabilities for issuers, experts,
or securities professionals. In addition, the Disclosure Proposals
would permit a municipal issuer to submit unaudited financial
statements subject to examination by the state comptroller's off-
ice. With these exceptions the basic approaches are much the same:
integrated periodic and pre-distribution reporting, exemptive and
prescriptive authority vested in a single body and the absence of
preissuance review of disclosure documents.
IV. Conclusion
Whether the Disclosure Proposals should be enacted into law is a
question that invites further definition. It may be urged, for exam-
ple, that disclosure legislation would be more effective if it estab-
lished disclosure standards and commanded their enforcement in
greater detail than is the case with the Disclosure Proposals. Legis-
lation, however, like politics, is the art of the possible, and the
Disclosure Proposals do take a number of steps in the direction of
providing informational protection to investors and potential inves-
tors in New York municipal securities. It thus seems clear that their
adoption is desirable from the narrow, but not unimportant, view-
point of assuring fairness to unsophisticated investors.
If this were the only matter of concern, one could argue that the
objective could be more effectively pursued by federal legislation.
The market for municipal securities is largely national (although
the tendency of states to limit state tax exemptions to their own
securities has some localizing effect). Uniformity of disclosure prac-
tices, including accounting standards, should facilitate comparisons
among municipal securities on a nationwide basis.
Further, to the extent that the investors in need of protection are
144. Proposed General Municipal Law § 33(2).
145. Id. at § 31-a(5).
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distributed nationwide, it -can be argued that the federal govern-
ment is a more appropriate sovereign to afford such protection.
Presumably the investors New York should concern itself with pro-
tecting are New Yorkers, who presumably need protection with re-
spect to Californian, as well as New York, municipal securities.
The foregoing should serve to underline that investor protection,
per se, is not the central governmental purpose of the Disclosure
Proposals, but is rather the means to accomplish a quite different
purpose: the protection of the capital markets to which New York
municipal borrowers must have more or less constant access.
Viewed from this perspective, it seems clear that the State of New
York has a more immediate and compelling interest in regulating
issuer disclosure with respect to New York municipal issuers than
does the federal government.
Municipal issuers do not, as a general proposition, engage in in-
terstate commerce. Access to capital markets for business corpora-
tions of national or transnational scope is obviously an appropriate
matter for federal concern. Comparable access for municipal issuers
seems primarily, in contrast, to be an appropriate matter for state
concern.
State government seems also to be the appropriate arbiter be-
tween the need for regulation with respect to disclosure by local
government issuers in order to protect access to capital markets and
other needs of local government issuers, such as freedom from un-
necessary regulatory and financial burdens in connection with local
government borrowing, and coordination of such borrowing with
operational and capital needs. Not only are local government enti-
ties themselves the creatures of state law, but also the entire author-
ity for municipal debt issuances derives from state constitutions and
statutes. To a much greater degree than is the case with corpora-
tions, municipal borrowing is subject to state regulation. Such fun-
damental elements as aggregate debt limitations, tax or other re-
sources available to service debt, uses of proceeds, repayment terms
and procedures for debt issuance, as well as accounting and budget-
ary process, are all mandated and monitored by state authorities.
The generally permissive posture of state corporation statutes is not
carried over to municipalities; state officials already have considera-
ble responsibility and experience in relation to local financing and
reporting.
[Vol. VI-1!
PROPOSED DISCLOSURE LEGISLATION
For these reasons, it is submitted that the Disclosure Proposals
are clearly preferable to expansion of the role of the Commission in
state and local government financing. The federal registration pro-
cess can often consume up to 10% of the proceeds of a corporate
issue. '4 Application of comparably detailed and expensive disclo-
sure requirements to the typically smaller but more numerous mu-
nicipal issues would add considerably to the cost of capital in a time
of mounting taxpayer dissatisfaction with the cost of local govern-
ment." 7 The Disclosure Proposals' provisions for state auditing, in-
tegration with existent fiscal monitoring reporting and state prepa-
ration of prototype reports would help to contain disclosure costs.
Finally, even without pre-distribution review of disclosure docu-
ments, the Williams Bill provisions raise constitutional uncertain-
ties. The federal imposition of pecuniary liabilities on state issuers
for materially untrue statements or omissions remains questionable
under the eleventh amendment and associated principles of sover-
eign immunity."' To the extent these protections were not available
to municipalities, a state government might be compelled to issue
securities on behalf of its localities. The resulting dislocation of
intrastate relations, as well as the changes in state and municipal
reporting and monitoring practices necessarily required to conform
to SEC disclosure requirements might also raise serious problems
under the tenth amendment as interpreted in National League of
Cities v. Usery."19 This argument was raised by New York City in a
suit brought to enjoin the SEC from proceeding with its recently
completed investigation of the city's finances:
[To] impose upon states, municipalities, other local governmental bodies
and their officials the everchanging standards under the federal securities
146. Proposed Amendments to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934: Hearings on S.2969
and S.2574 'Before the Subcomm. on Securities of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing
and Urban Affairs, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 320 (1976) (statement of R. Doty).
147. Id. at 44 (statement of H. Kapnick), 115 (statement of J. Phillips), 127 (statement
of R. Kezer), 156-166 (statement of R. Carver).
148. A detailed discussion of these questions is beyond the scope of this article. See Note,
Disclosure by Issuers of Municipal Securities: An Analysis of Recent Proposals and a Sug-
gested Approach, 29 VAND. L. RPv. 1016, 1048-54 (1976); Comment, Federal Regulation of
Municipal Securities: A Constitutional and Statutory Analysis, 1976 DUKE L.J. 1261, 1288-
310.149. 426 U.S.' 833 (1976). See Comment, Federal Regulation of Municipal Securities: A
Constitutional and Statutory Analysis, 1976 DUKE L.J. 1261, 1310-19.
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laws of disclosure, scienter, causation, materiality and the like, as evolved
from time to time by the SEC and the federal courts, would seriously inter-
fere with the ability of such officials to act as political and governmental
leaders and, consequently, with the ability of states and their political and
governmental subdivisions to function as sovereign entities. The imposition
of such standards would result in state and local officials being required to
explain and justify to federal officials myriad local governmental and politi-
cal decisions and their acts (or failures to act) and statements (or failures to
make statements) with respect to such decisions. It would thereby seriously
affect (i) the manner in which fundamental policy choices are made involving
the governing of states and local governments, and (ii) the substance of those
choices. As a consequence, state and local government policies regarding the
manner in which state and local governments structure delivery of those
governmental services which their citizens require would be displaced by
federal action.1'0
New York surpasses all other states in the dollar amount of gov-
ernmental securities outstanding. New York local governments
(excluding the state government) had over $25 billion of debt out-
standing at the end of fiscal 1975. This figure represents 17% of the
debt outstanding of all local governments nationwide.' 5 These sta-
tistics highlight the obvious fact that New York local governments
have a strong interest in protecting their access to the market by
preserving investor confidence. The Disclosure Proposals would pro-
vide for sufficient disclosure of financial and other information
within the context of state fiscal regulation in a manner least likely
to disrupt or burden governmental operations. Existing federal an-
tifraud provisions, as exemplified in the Bache' and Luebbe53 deci-
sions, should be sufficiently potent spurs to the adequate participa-
tion of underwriters, broker-dealers and counsel in the disclosure
process.
150. Complaint in City of New York v. SEC, 76 Civ. 3307 (S.D.N.Y. filed July 27, 1976),
reprinted in [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 95,667 at 90,279-80
(1976).
151. 15 THE BOND BUYER'S 1976 MUNICIPAL FINANCE STATISTICS 35 (1977).
152. See text accompanying notes 67-69 supra.
153. See text accompanying note 70 supra.
[Vol. VIII
